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Abstract
Address clustering tries to construct the one-to-many mapping from
entities to addresses in the Bitcoin system. Simple heuristics based on
the micro-structure of transactions have proved very effective in practice.
In this paper we describe the primary reasons behind this effectiveness:
address reuse, avoidable merging, super-clusters with high centrality, and
the incremental growth of address clusters. We quantify their impact
during Bitcoin’s first seven years of existence.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a double-edged sword for financial privacy. It allows anyone to con-
duct financial transactions with anyone else in the world without having to
divulge identifying information to intermediaries. However, it requires those
transactions to be broadcast to the world. The contents of the transactions,
their relationship with other transactions, and the very act of broadcasting
the transactions themselves may unintentionally disclose information about the
transactors to interested third parties. In fact, many interested third parties
systematically gather and analyze this information for reasons such as market
research, competitor analysis, compliance, and law enforcement.
Address clustering is a cornerstone of this analysis. It partitions the set of
addresses observed in Bitcoin transactions into maximal subsets of addresses
that are likely controlled by the same entity. Each subset in the partition is
an address cluster. When combined with address tagging (associating real-
world identities with addresses) and graph analysis, it is an effective means
of analysing Bitcoin activity at both the micro- and macro-levels, see, e.g.,
[1, 3, 6, 9, 16, 17, 20, 23]. Experimental analysis has shown that a single heuristic
(the multi-input heuristic) can identify more than 69% of the addresses in the
wallets stored by lightweight clients.
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Figure 1: A graphical summary of the most significant flows of bitcoin between
the largest address clusters during Bitcoin’s first five years in existence. The
vertices correspond to address clusters: red vertices are darknet markets; purple
vertices are gambling services; green vertices are exchanges and blue vertices are
mining pools. The gray vertices are not immediately identifiable using publicly
available information.
As a token of its effectiveness, consider Fig 1. This is a graphical summary of
the most significant flows of bitcoin between the largest address clusters during
Bitcoin’s first five years in existence. Using publicly available information, we
can identify all but the gray vertices: the red vertices are darknet markets; the
purple vertices are gambling services; the green vertices are exchanges and the
blue vertices are mining pools. The labels for the exchanges and mining pools,
although known, are omitted to avoid indiscriminately linking their identities to
darknet markets without fully presenting the methodology behind this summary
and the definitions for “most significant flows” and “largest address clusters”.
However, it is based on the methodologies presented in the papers above and
relies on address clustering at its core.
This paper considers the reasons behind the effectiveness of address clus-
tering using the multi-input heuristic [13]. This heuristic assumes that the
addresses in transaction outputs redeemed in a multi-input transaction were
controlled by the same entity. Although not true in the general case, it is a
useful heuristic in practice. In Sect. 2 we briefly list some related work. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4 we study address cluster counts and sizes. We quantify the levels
of address reuse and cluster merging. We observe “super-clusters” and analyze
their centrality. We study the formation and structure of address clusters in
Sect. 5. We conclude with some future work in Sect. 6.
2 Related Work
Address clusters are the fundamental building-blocks on which many high-level
blockchain analyses are performed. They can be constructed using the multi-
input heuristic as noted by Bitcoin’s creator [13]. Reid and Harrigan [20] con-
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sidered the impact of address clusters on anonymity. This approach can be
augmented with change heuristics [1,9,23], temporal behavior [10,17] and trans-
action fingerprinting [3]. Although the analyses in the present paper are based
on the multi-input heuristic only, they can be extended to any combination of
heuristics.
Nick [15] analyzed the performance of several clustering heuristics by exploit-
ing a vulnerability in connection Bloom filtering used by lightweight clients. He
found that the multi-input heuristic can identify more than 69% of the addresses
in the vulnerable wallets.
Ober et al. [16] studied the sizes and lifespans of address clusters and showed
that the sizes of the address clusters follow a scale-free distribution. Lischke and
Fabian [6] showed that major darknet markets, gambling services, exchanges and
mining pools were major hubs in the address cluster graph (similar to Fig. 1
but not limited to the largest address clusters) during Bitcoin’s first four years
of existence.
Maxwell described CoinJoin [7], a protocol for trustless centralized Bitcoin
mixing. This causes the multi-input heuristic to produce false positives. Coin-
Join is a centralized mixing protocol; it requires a third-party or CoinJoin
server to operate. Other protocols in this category include Mixcoin [2] and
Blindcoin [25]. Decentralized mixing protocols do not require any third-party,
trusted or trustless. Protocols in this category include CoinSwap [8], CoinShuf-
fle [21] and CoinParty [26]. Shentu and Yu [22] review several trustless Bitcoin
protocols.
Mo¨ser et al. [11, 12] considered the implications of blockchain analyses, in-
cluding address clustering, for anti-money laundering. Imwinkelreid [5] dis-
cussed its implications for digital forensics.
3 Counting Address Clusters
The following analyses were performed when the block at the tip of the Bitcoin
blockchain was at height 396 577 and the last eight hexadecimal digits of the
block hash were 900a6f4c.
Figure 2 compares the monthly counts of transactions (red line) with the
monthly counts of new addresses (blue line). The number of new addresses has
grown in line with the number of transactions. The monthly counts of address
clusters (green line) with at least two addresses has grown at a much slower
rate.
We consider the relationship between these counts in Fig. 3. We plot the
number of new addresses observed per transaction (purple line) and the number
of newly merged address clusters created per transaction (orange line). To adjust
for the rapid growth in transactions in Bitcoin’s recent history, we replace the
horizontal time axis with ordinal transaction numbers: this compresses low-
activity periods and expands high-activity periods. We observe that both ratios
have been relatively stable for the past two years and that the former is an order
of magnitude larger than the latter.
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Figure 2: A plot of the monthly counts of transactions (red line), new addresses
(blue line) and address clusters (green line) with at least two addresses. For
the past two years, the monthly number of new addresses is greater than the
monthly number of transactions.
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Figure 3: A plot of the ratios of new addresses per transaction (purple line) and
newly merged address clusters per transaction (orange line). The maximum ad-
dresses per transaction (brown line) and non-trivial transactions per transaction
(pink line) are respective upper bounds.
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Can we establish upper bounds for the two ratios? Nakamoto [13] suggested
that “a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being
linked to a common owner.” This is from the perspective of the payee(s) only; if
the payer requires additional transaction outputs, say, for change, they should
also use a new address. For transaction outputs that contain Pay-to-PubKey
and Pay-to-PubKey-Hash scripts, the number of transaction outputs per trans-
action is an upper bound for the number of new addresses per transaction. This
can be adjusted for transaction outputs that contain OP RETURN scripts, multi-
signature scripts and Pay-to-Script-Hash scripts where the redemption script is
known (brown line). The gap between the brown and purple lines is a measure
of the level of address reuse; the wider the gap the greater the level of address
reuse.
Similarly, the fraction of transactions that spend at least two transaction
outputs assigned to different addresses (pink line) is an upper bound for the
number of newly merged address clusters per transaction. We refer to these
transactions as being non-trivial. If every transaction output created a new
address then every non-trivial transaction would create a newly merged address
cluster. The gap between the pink and orange lines is a measure of the level
of cluster merging; the wider the gap the greater the level of cluster merging.
Even in the presence of address reuse, this gap could be narrowed through the
use of merge avoidance [4, 18].
The existence of both gaps is significant. New key pairs are not being gen-
erated for every transaction allowing the multi-input heuristic to link addresses
to a common owner. This is one reason that address clustering is unreason-
ably effective. There is considerable reuse of addresses and merging of address
clusters. We will discuss a second reason in the next section.
4 Measuring Cluster Sizes
The address clusters with at least two addresses are binned by size in Fig. 4.
Both the horizontal and the vertical axes use logarithmic scales. We observe
the presence of “super-clusters”: there are 1955 address clusters with at least
1000 addresses but less than 10 million addresses. They cover 22% of all of the
addresses represented in Fig. 4 and 16% of all of the addresses observed at the
time of the analysis.
We exclude the single address cluster with greater than 10 million addresses.
This address cluster originally belonged to the Mt. Gox exchange that, for a
time, allowed users to import private-keys directly from their wallets. This
feature causes the multi-input heuristic to produce false positives and requires
more advanced heuristics to separate the Mt. Gox addresses. We will discuss
this issue in Sect. 5.
The super-clusters are not only large in terms of the number of addresses
they contain, they are also hubs in terms of the number of transactions they are
involved in. At the time of the analysis, the 107 million transactions created
319 million transaction outputs and redeemed 285 million of those through
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Figure 4: A histogram showing the number of address clusters with at least two
addresses in each size range.
7
transaction inputs. Of those, the super-clusters were responsible for 72 million
or 23% of the transaction outputs and 51 million or 18% of the transaction
inputs. If we can link identities to the super-clusters then we can identify at
least one of the transactors in a considerable number of transactions.
Lischke and Fabian [6] made a related finding—they analyzed the degree
centrality of the vertices in a network similar to the one in Fig. 1 but not
limited to the largest address clusters, and found that the vertices representing
the major darknet markets, gambling services, exchanges and mining pools had
the highest degree centralities.
The existence and centrality of super-clusters is another reason that address
clustering is unreasonably effective. Many of the major services reuse addresses
and generate super-clusters thereby identifying much of their on-chain activity.
Furthermore, this identifies much of the activity between the service and their
users: deposits and withdrawals can be easily identified. This can be exploited
to produce “wallet explorers” such as WalletExplorer.com. It also makes the
services vulnerable to re-identification attacks [9].
Major services can avoid creating super-clusters. For example, Coinbase,
the Bitcoin exchange and wallet provider, does not create a super-cluster that
identifies all activity between the service and their users. They are notably
absent from many high-level blockchain analyses. This is not to say that they
do not create any large clusters. It simply means that the multi-input heuristic
alone is insufficient for identifying all of their on-chain activity.
5 Formation and Structure
The address clustering heuristics listed in Sect. 2 cause address clusters to merge.
We are not aware of any published heuristics that cause address clusters to split,
e.g. to counter the mixing protocols in Sect. 2 or to partition the Mt. Gox address
cluster in Sect. 4. When address clusters merge, we can measure the increases
in size of the newly merged cluster. For example, suppose a transaction causes
four address clusters of sizes 1, 1, 2 and 10 to merge. This can be represented
by increases of 1, 1 and 2. Considering the multi-input heuristic only, the
distribution of these increases is heavily concentrated around a median value of
one. Figure 5 plots the 99th percentile, 999th permille, 9999th 10 000-quantile
and 99 999th 100 000-quantile for every 250 000 transactions. We observe that
large increases in address cluster sizes are rare. The multi-input heuristic usually
merges at most one large address cluster with one or more small address clusters,
but rarely merges two or more large address clusters.
This behaviour can be visualised as follows. Consider a bipartite graph for
each address cluster generated using the multi-input heuristic where each vertex
represents either an address (an address vertex) or a transaction (a transaction
vertex) and each edge between an address vertex and a transaction vertex rep-
resents the transaction spending a transaction output that was controlled by
the address. Figure 6 is the bipartite graph for a typical address cluster1. The
1The address cluster contains the address 1H7RNFmAbtMgVJzK72hNFerGBfKuRekTMU: it re-
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Figure 5: A plot of the q − 1th q-quantiles for q = 100, 1000, 10000, 100000 of
the distributions of the increases in cluster size due to merging for every 250 000
transactions. The increases are heavily concentrated around median values of
one. For the past 30 million transactions, the 99th percentiles are also at one.
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Figure 6: A bipartite graph representing the structure of an address cluster:
white vertices are addresses; gray vertices are transactions; edges connect trans-
action vertices to address vertices when the corresponding transaction spends
transaction outputs that were assigned to the corresponding addresses.
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white vertices are the address vertices. The address vertices that correspond to
addresses with non-zero balances are annotated with their current and all-time
maximum balances. The majority of addresses have zero balances. The gray
vertices are the transactions—they connect together the addresses to form the
address cluster. Address vertices that are connected through multiple indepen-
dent paths have multiple independent sets of transactions indicating that they
are part of the same address cluster.
This graph was formed by small address clusters (the singleton address ver-
tices along the periphery) merging with the large address cluster, through trans-
action vertices that connected the singleton address vertices to address vertices
with non-zero balances. It is rare for such a graph to form as two large discon-
nected components, each containing at least one address vertex with a non-zero
balance, and then to merge into a single connected component.
Address clusters that form when two large address clusters merge can be
flagged as exhibiting unusual merging activity. This can be extended to a heuris-
tic for splitting address clusters that may not be controlled by the same entity.
For example, if we identify the 0.01% of transactions that resulted in the largest
increases in cluster size during the lifetime of the Mt. Gox exchange (July 2010
to February 2014), then the majority of those transactions spend transaction
outputs that were controlled by the Mt. Gox address cluster. This is likely due
to their private-key import feature.
The incremental growth of address clusters is beneficial for many high-level
blockchain analyses. The address clustering is relatively stable over time. It
is a rarity for two large address clusters to merge, thereby drastically changing
the results of an earlier analysis. If fact, if two large address clusters do merge,
it may indicate that the multi-input heuristic has produced a false positive.
Furthermore, the address clustering is suitable for real-time analyses. Small
address clusters merge with large address clusters early in their lifetime and the
large address clusters are more likely to have identifying information associated
with them.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have enumerated and analyzed the primary reasons behind the effectiveness
of address clustering using Bitcoin’s blockchain. These are the high-levels of
address reuse and avoidable merging; the existence of super-clusters with high
centrality, and the incremental growth of address clusters.
The results can inform and help blockchain analysts. For example, the super-
clusters are primary targets for re-identification attacks. The technique at the
end of Sect. 5 can flag address clusters that may include addresses from more
than one entity.
The opposing camp, those seeking to hinder blockchain analysis, can also
benefit from these results. For example, the adoption and impact of privacy-
ceived bitcoins from a mining pool (DeepBit), sent bitcoins to exchanges (Mt. Gox and
bitcoin.de) and purchased goods through a Bitcoin payment processor (BitPay).
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enhancing techniques such as merge avoidance and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman-
Merkle (ECDHM) address schemes, e.g. stealth addresses [24], reusable payment
codes (BIP47) [19] and out of band address exchange (BIP75) [14], can be mea-
sured indirectly through the gap between the number of non-trivial transac-
tions and the number of address clusters created or merged per transaction (see
Sect. 3).
Our future work revolves around the internal structure of address clusters,
a` la the bipartite graph in Fig. 6. This representation shows the structure of
an address cluster beyond a simple set of addresses and may provide further
insight into its formation and behavior.
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